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Abstract
In many sectors, freedom in capital flow has allowed optimization of investment returns through choosing sites that provide
the best value for money. These returns, however, can be compromised in countries where corruption is prevalent. We
assessed where the best value for money might be obtained for investment in threatened species that occur at a single site,
when taking into account corruption. We found that the influence of corruption on potential investment decisions was
outweighed by the likely value for money in terms of pricing parity. Nevertheless global conservation is likely to get best
returns in terms of threatened species security by investing in ‘‘honest’’ countries than in corrupt ones, particularly those
with a high cost of living.
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Introduction
In 2008 the operating expenditure of the four largest interna-
tional conservation organizations topped US$1 billion: The Nature
Conservancy $616 million [1], Wildlife Conservation Society $205
million [2], WWF International $161 million [3], Conservation
International$144 million [4].While thisis only a fractionofwhat is
needed [5,6], the total is substantial when considered together with
the many other government, non-government and business
investments in conservation. This can have a substantial benefit
for local economies, particularly in rural and remote areas where
many of the world’s poor coexist with conservation assets. In many
ways, therefore, foreign investment (FDI) for conservation invest-
ment might be expected to operate along lines similar to other FDI.
Multi-country studies of FDI suggest that investment flows are
influenced first by the presence of assets, such as natural resources
or human capacity. Given the presence of such assets, decisions
are then based around a range of financial and governance
considerations such as cost of labour, tax concessions, government
stability, internal and external conflict, corruption and ethnic
tensions, law and order, democratic accountability of government,
and quality of bureaucracy [7]. Such motivations resemble the
criteria for prioritising investment in conservation assets [8,9]:
providing greatest support to the most threatened conservation
values and supporting conservation in countries where the
likelihood of success is highest, as evidenced by factors such as
strong political support for conservation [10], supportive legisla-
tion and enforcement [11], low corruption and matching funding
at appropriate levels [12].
While there has been a significant push to start incorporating
cost into conservation plans [13–16], no study to our knowledge
has simultaneously considered the cost-effectiveness of conserva-
tion decisions and the consequences of corruption costs.
Corruption manifests itself in various ways including embezzle-
ment of funds, demanding of bribes for compliance, patronage or
political influence and acceptance of bribes to overlook illegal
activities [17]. This can reduce the effectiveness of conservation
programs by reducing the financial resources, law enforcement
and political support available for conservation [18] as well as
acting as an incentive for the overexploitation of resources [19]
and delaying environmental recovery [20]. Effectively corruption
can stifle effective investment in conservation just as it does
investment in economic growth [21]. It is also seen as one of the
major impediments to conservation in tropical countries [22,23].
However, poor countries can offer a better return on investment
than those with a high cost of living [24]. And although there is a
strong correlation [25], poor countries are not necessarily corrupt
nor are rich countries honest. Just as the freedom of movement of
global capital has encouraged investment in countries with low
labor and other costs [26,27], so global conservation capital can
potentially receive greater dividends in terms of effective
management through investment in poorer countries.
More Endemic Bird Areas, biodiversity hotspots and other high
priority terrestrial eco-regions occur in countries containing lower
governance scores than in countries without such conservation
assets [28]. Single site threatened species (SSTS), the 20% of the
4,239 threatened mammals, birds, tortoises and turtles, and
amphibians listed by the IUCN that are dependent for their
survival on conservation at single sites in the short- to medium
term [29], are more evenly spread around the globe. This gives a
wider choice for potential investments making it possible to
maximize efficiency of conservation investment, although such
investment choices could require trade-offs that may include
extinction [30] if funds are insufficient. All SSTS live in places that
are irreplaceable. Thus minimizing costs by optimizing choice of
sites [31] is not possible.
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financial return on conservation investment for single site
threatened species. We also explore the influence of potential
conservation cost on efficient investment decisions, recognising
that some species are more expensive to conserve than others but
considering all to be equally worthy of conservation.
Results
The choice of country in which to invest funds for conserving
single site threatened species (SSTS) varied substantially depend-
ing on the relative influence of number of SSTS, purchasing
power parity (PPP) or the potential for corruption on investment
decisions. Predictably the cheapest and most corrupt are largely
very poor while the more expensive but more honest are relatively
wealthy, or are possessions of wealthy nations. However the ten
countries that rank highest when both corruption and purchasing
power are considered are all such poor nations that the value of
the dollar renders corruption affordable (Table 1). These ten lie
along the right side of the corruption/purchasing power data
cloud (Figure 1). The level of corruption affects the investment
priorities only when the number of SSTS present in the country is
considered. Thus, among the 23 countries with a single SSTS,
Ghana ranks higher than many poorer countries because of its
relative honesty. Similarly, among the ten countries ranked highest
for number of SSTS, New Zealand, with the lowest level of
corruption, ranks highest because, though relatively expensive, it
has the best corruption index score of any country.
We found that a strategy that prioritizes investment solely on the
basis of the purchasing power of the dollar accumulates
conservation investment rapidly whereas one that minimizes losses
to corruption has a lower accumulation rate that is closely
associated with the number of SSTS in a country (Figure 2). If only
half the required funds are available, 349 species across 36
countries will have been managed (i.e. threats ameliorated to
enhance probability of persistence) if corruption minimization is
used as the main priority for funding whereas 498 species in 43
countries will have been managed if value for money is the sole
criteria (Table 2). When the number of SSTS in a country is the
only driver of investment, the returns on investment rise steadily
on a trajectory between the other two because the number of
SSTS is spread among countries with a variety of corruption index
and purchasing power parity (PPP) scores. Because value of the
dollar is so much more influential than corruption on potential
investment strategies, the efficient strategy that balances corrup-
tion index and PPP is virtually indistinguishable from PPP alone.
Thus the countries that would ostensibly give the greatest returns
on investment in SSTS based on the value of the dollar after
corruption are also considered among the poorest in the world
(Figure 3).
Table 1. Highest and lowest ranking countries for investment in Single Site Threatened Species prioritized against different
criteria.
Most species Cheapest Most honest Best value
Best value including
species no.
Mexico Ethiopia New Zealand Ethiopia Mexico
Colombia Pakistan Canada Pakistan Colombia
Peru Guinea Australia Guinea Brazil
Indonesia Kyrgyzstan Gough, Inaccessible,
Henderson Is. (UK)
Sao Tome and Principe Australia
Brazil Sao Tome and Principe Amsterdam I. (France) Kyrgyzstan United States of America
Cuba Iran Chile Vietnam Peru
China Vietnam Bermuda Iran Indonesia
Ecuador Uganda Japan India Japan
United States of America India St Lucia Ghana China
Madagascar Ghana United States of America Uganda New Zealand
Fewest species (1 each) Most expensive Most corrupt Worst value
Worst value including
species no.
Amsterdam I. (France),
Angola, Armenia,
British Virgin Is.,
Cape Verde, Cook Is.,
Djibouti, Dominica,
El Salvador, Equatorial
Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Ghana, Grenada, Israel,
Italy, Kyrgyzstan,
Le Reunion, Oman,
Pakistan, Samoa,
Sri Lanka, Turkey
Japan Somalia Japan Ethiopia
Gough, Inaccessible,
Henderson Is. (UK)
Equatorial Guinea Gough, Inaccessible,
Henderson Is. (UK)
Pakistan
Le Reunion Zimbabwe Northern Marianas Kyrgyzstan
Amsterdam I. (France) Papua New Guinea Le Reunion Ghana
Northern Marianas Angola Amsterdam I. (France) Sri Lanka
Australia Guinea New Caledonia Armenia
French Polynesia Kyrgyzstan French Polynesia El Salvador
Canada Venezuela Australia Djibouti
New Caledonia Cote d’Ivoire Canada Dominica
Bermuda Haiti Bermuda Turkey
Ranks are best to worst in top section, worst to best in lower section. Best value including species number sorts the countries with the most and least SSTS taking
account of PPP and CI.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022749.t001
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Conservation FDI by non-government organizations and others
needs to be based on sound business principles if donors’ funds are
to be effective and their influence sustained. The two factors
explored here, corruption and purchasing power parity, are
examples of considerations that have to be made before
investment occurs. Many other sustainability, equity or cost
efficiency measures could be used in a similar manner to prioritize
reserve acquisition, carbon retention or other conservation
Figure 1. Corruption Index and Purchasing Power Parity for countries with Single Site Threatened Species (filled markers indicate
the ten countries giving greatest returns on investment).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022749.g001
Figure 2. Cumulative number of Single Site Threatened Species (SSTS) prioritised on the basis of number of species (n); purchasing
power parity (PPP); corruption index (CI), CI*PPP, CI*PPP*n against the proportion of the total funds required to maintain all SSTS
((n*CI*PPP)/S(n*CI*PPP)). PPP and CI*PPP are virtually overlapping so only symbols are presented for CI*PPP.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022749.g002
Threatened Species, Corruption and Buying Power
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is that risk associated with conservation FDI needs to be managed
in the same way as that of other direct investment, even if the
criteria for success of a venture might differ. For the example used
here, single-site threatened species, our analyses suggest that
prioritizing primarily on the basis of the potential for corruption is
much less efficient than doing so on the basis of value for money.
This result is supported by earlier analyses [32] with respect to
protected area conservation, and is also consistent with business
literature where country-specific direct costs of production are but
one of a constellation of factors affecting investment [32,33]. This
finding does not mean that all available SSTS funds should be
spent in low income countries but that corruption levels should be
less influential than PPP in any broader risk assessment.
The results suggest that investment in the highest risk countries
is warranted despite prevailing levels of corruption. The map in
Figure 3 looks very different to prioritization maps based around
hot spots or other combinations of threat and biodiversity [34].
While it could be argued that losses to bribery of local officials is
just one aspect of corruption, with delays, opportunity costs,
transaction costs associated with operating in the underground
economy and uncertainty of returns on investments all adding to
investment disincentives, the actual funds lost to corruption, even
if bribes are paid, are relatively low compared to differences in
wealth between nations.
This too reflects business decisions where investment in high
value resources, such as oil, coltan or diamonds, occurs despite
corruption. In fact some studies have shown that a certain level of
corruption increases FDI because of increased efficiency within
bureaucracies [35], though other studies of the same countries
over a longer period showed that corruption inhibited both growth
and investment [36]. It is thus incumbent on investors to adopt
corruption management strategies rather than try to avoid
corruption altogether.
How this is done is potentially a rich avenue of research that can
also draw on the economic and development literature [37,38]. In
particular the more Machiavellian strategies of companies
extracting finite resources over a short time period, such as bribes
and mercenaries, need to be contrasted with those of companies
wishing to develop a market that can provide sustained profits over
extended periods. Strategies which deter corruption, such as
payment of fair wages, more stringent accounting procedures and
management partnerships, need to be deployed in countries with
low governance scores [25,28]. However the existence of species
that will no longer be available for investment without immediate
intervention may make corruption tempting, even if their long-
Figure 3. Map of priorities for funding of Single Site Threatened Species (SSTS) based on the balance between the purchasing
power parity and the corruption index. Quintile colours run from dark blue (high returns on investment) through light blue, pink and red to
crimson (low returns on investment). Countries in white lacked analysed SSTS.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022749.g003
Table 2. The proportion of countries receiving Single Site Threatened Species (SSTS) investments based on five investment
strategies, assuming the same average cost of species management.
Disbursement criteria Most species Cheapest Most honest Best value Best value including species no.
% SSTS in top ten countries 377 44 105 44 350
% SSTS in top 50% countries 90 52 42 51 89
% countries receiving investment if 50%
of required funds available
13 44 48 52 11
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0022749.t002
Threatened Species, Corruption and Buying Power
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eventually demand an entirely different approach. Perhaps
conservation investment should be more closely coupled to the
free trade arguments which, despite widespread criticism, have
reduced poverty [39], and improved social function and
governance [40] – linking conservation FDI to a raft of reforms
that reduce investment inefficiencies, taking into account country-
specific negative and positive externalities that will affect
conservation decisions. Certainly the wrong message will be
transmitted if conservation investors reward corrupt countries
simply because they are more effective at threatening their
biodiversity.
In this respect corruption, as well as value for money in terms of
pricing parity, could still usefully be added to some of the analyses
of cost-effectiveness for global prioritization. For example,
Madagascar, Papua New Guinea, Cuba, Indonesia and Brazil
are listed as the five countries most poorly funded for the
conservation of mammals in proportion to the cost of conservation
[31]. Cuba, however, is less than half as corrupt as Papua New
Guinea and therefore may be a much better country in which to
undertake conservation. The principal message, however, is that
discrepancies in wealth, of which corruption can be a symptom as
well as a cause, have the greatest potential influence on efficiency
in SSTS investment. Arguably investment in the least wealthy
countries with SSTS could also maximize the social benefit of
threatened species investment.
Materials and Methods
Countries supporting SSTS were identified from the database of
the Alliance for Zero Extinction [41]. Species listed as other than
Critically Endangered (CR), Endangered (EN) or Vulnerable (VU)
were excluded, leaving 764 species. For each of the 85 countries
included in the analysis, the PPP was determined from the ratio of
the PPP conversion factor (the number of units of a country’s
currency required to buy the same amount of goods and services in
the domestic market as a $US would buy in the United States [42])
and the real exchange rate between each country’s currency and
the $US (as at 14 April 2010), providing the cost of the bundle of
goods that make up gross domestic product (GDP) across countries
(i.e. dollars needed to buy a dollar’s worth of goods in the country
as compared to the United States). At the time of data collection
the purchasing power parity (PPP), which was standardized to the
value of the US$, varied from $3.98 (Ethiopia) to $0.67 (Japan). It
was thus assumed that each dollar spent on conservation action in
Ethiopia, the least expensive country, could purchase just $0.17
worth of conservation action in Japan. Estimates of the money lost
to corruption were based on World Bank estimates of the
percentage of revenues firms pay in unofficial payments per
annum to public officials [43]. This data is categorical (% firms
paying ,1%, 1–2%, 2–10%, 10–12%, 13–25%, .25%) which
was converted to a single figure by summing the product of the
maximum for each category and the percentage of firms paying in
that category (the category .25% was taken as 50%, but made no
difference if taken as 100% as an average of only 1% of firms paid
bribes of this size). As the relevant information was only available
for 58 countries, the percentage of revenue scores were correlated
with governance measures for the same countries using the
Control of Corruption Index of the World Bank [44]. The best fit
was y=0.2203e
25016x (R
2=0.5428). We did also test the bribery
estimates against a range of global datasets on governance and
human development [44,45] using multiple OLS regression
models, GLM and mixed-effects models. We tested for interactions
between the explanatory variables and applied the stepwise
function in the program R to obtain the best model using the
AIC. However, while we were able to develop a linear regression
model with an adjusted R
2 of 0.592 in which the significant
variables were the World Bank indicators Rule of Law, Voice and
Accountability, Regulatory Quality, and Control of Corruption,
and the UNDP indicators GDP per capita, PPP, Human
Development Index, Life expectancy at birth and Mean years of
schooling of adults, several of these variables were significant in
unexpected directions and we felt that the simpler exponential
relationship between the average amounts paid in bribes and the
Control of Corruption Index was probably as likely to give
accurate estimates of the missing values as the complex model. We
were also aware that, regardless of the regression analysis used, the
variation in buying power was over 30 times greater than the
variation in the effects of CI so that minor variations in the missing
values were unlikely to influence the final result.
This equation was then used to translate the Corruption
Perception Index scores of the countries with single site threatened
species that lacked World Bank estimates of revenue loss (41
countries supporting 38% of SSTS considered) into an approx-
imation of the proportion of each dollar spent that reached its
conservation target after bribes had been paid. Resulting estimates
varied from 0.1% average loss for New Zealand to 7.6% for
Somalia. For French Polynesia (France), Amsterdam (France),
Gough (UK), Inaccessible (UK) and Henderson Islands (UK)
(collectively supporting 2% of SSTS) information on PPP and
corruption was derived from the relevant colonial nation with a
nominal 20% surcharge on PPP to account for the higher costs of
investment arising from isolation. For the British Virgin Islands
(supporting 1 SSTS), which lacked any estimate of corruption,
data from the American Virgin Islands were used).
The product of PPP and the corruption index was used to
estimate the interaction between the two: a dollar spent on
conservation in a country in which US$1 buys two units of
conservation but with a corruption index of 0.5 would have the
same impact on the ground as a dollar spent in the US assuming it
had no corruption (CI=1.0).
Following the argument of Balmford et al. [5], one SSTS was
deemed to cost, on average, the equivalent to maintain in local
currency regardless of country. On this basis countries were
ranked using four different metrics to guide alternative investment
strategies within different financial risk environments:
1. Number of SSTS/country (n): the top priority for investment is
the one with the most SSTS.
2. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP): the investment strategy aims to
gain greatest value for money, regardless of number of species
or the level of corruption
3. Corruption Index (CI): the investment strategy aims to avoid
rent seeking behavior, regardless of other considerations
4. Efficient (PPP6CI): the investment strategy aims to optimize
investment, balancing the value of the dollar against levels of
corruption.
4. In addition the ten countries with the highest SSTS and the 23
with only one SSTS were ranked based on the efficient
investment estimates.
5. Maximized: the investment strategy aims to maximize the
number of species after value of the dollar and corruption risk
has been taken into account.
Using a sequential investment strategy (i.e. all SSTS in one
country will be invested in before any in the next), the cumulative
total of species and the cumulative total conservation units
Threatened Species, Corruption and Buying Power
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1.00) were calculated for each ranking strategy.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Gill Ainsworth for her assistance in the early stages
of the research, Ron Ninnis for assistance with the map and Stuart
Butchart at BirdLife International for discussions about the concept.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: STG KKZ LJ. Performed the
experiments: STG KKZ LJ JW. Analyzed the data: STG KKZ LJ.
Contributed reagents/materials/analysis tools: LJ. Wrote the paper: STG
KKZ LJ JW.
References
1. The Nature Conservancy (2009) The Nature Conservancy Consolidated
Financial Statements as of June 30 2009 and 2008. Washington, DC, USA:
The Nature Conservancy. 28 p.
2. Wildlife Conservation Society (2008) Annual Report. New York, NY, USA:
Wildlife Conservation Society. 65 p.
3. World Wildlife Fund International (2008) Annual Report 2008 - Funding and
Financial Overview. Geneva, Switzerland: World Wildlife Fund (WWF)
International, Available: http://www.worldwildlife.org/who/financialinfo/
2008fundingandfinancialoverview.html. Accessed 2010 July 15.
4. Conservation International (2008) Conservation International Foundation and
Affiliates. Consolidated Financial Report June 30, 2009. ArlingtonVirginia:
Conservation International. 24 p.
5. Balmford A, Gaston KJ, Blyth S, James A, Kapos V (2003) Global variation in
terrestrial conservation costs, conservation benefits, and unmet conservation
needs. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 100: 1046–1050.
6. James AN, Gaston KJ, Balmford A (1999) Balancing the Earth’s accounts.
Nature 401: 323–324.
7. Busse M, Hefeker C (2007) Political risk, institutions and foreign direct
investment. Eur J Polit Econ 23: 397–415.
8. Wilson KA, McBride MF, Bode M, Possingham HP (2006) Prioritizing global
conservation efforts. Nature 440: 337–340.
9. Wilson KA, Underwood EC, Morrison SA, Klausmeyer KR, Murdoch WW,
et al. (2007) Conserving Biodiversity Efficiently: What to Do, Where, and When.
PLoS Biol 5(9): e223.
10. Myers N (1988) Lifting the veil on perverse subsidies. Nature 392: 327–328.
11. Leader-Williams N, Harrison J, Green MJB (1990) Designing protected areas to
conserve natural resources. Sci Prog 74: 189–204.
12. Bruner AG, Gullison RE, Balmford A (2004) Financial Costs and Shortfalls of
Managing and Expanding Protected-Area Systems in Developing Countries. Bio
Science 54: 1119–1126.
13. Possingham HP, Andelman SJ, Noon BR, Trombulak S, Pulliam HR (2001)
Making Smart Conservation Decisions. In Orians G, Soule ´ M, eds. Research
Priorities for Conservation Biology. California: Island Press. pp 225–244.
1 4 .B o d eM ,W a t s o nJ ,I w a m u r aT ,P o s s i n g h a mH P( 2 0 0 8 )T h ec o s to f
conservation. Science 321: 340.
15. McCarthy MA, Thompson CJ, Garnett ST (2008) Optimal investment in
conservation of species. J Appl Ecol 45: 1428–1435.
16. Joseph LN, Maloney RF, Possingham HP (2009) Optimal Allocation of
Resources among Threatened Species: a Project Prioritization Protocol. Conserv
Biol 23: 328–338.
17. Davis J (2004) Corruption in public service delivery: experience from South
Asia’s water and sanitation sector. World Devel 32: 53–71.
18. Damania R, Fredriksson PG, List JA (2003) Trade liberalization, corruption,
and environmental policy formation: theory and evidence. J Environ Econ
Manag 46: 490–512.
19. Smith RJ, Walpole MJ (2005) Should conservationists pay more attention to
corruption? Oryx 39: 251–256.
20. Lo ´pez R, Mitra S (2000) Corruption, Pollution, and the Kuznets Environment
Curve. J Environ Econ Manag 40: 137–150.
21. Wei S-J (2000) Local Corruption and Global Capital Flows. Brookings Pap Eco
Ac 31: 303–354.
22. Ceballos G, Vale MM, Bonacic C, Calvo-Alvarado J, List R, et al. (2008)
Conservation Challenges for the Austral and Neotropical America Section.
Conserv Biol 23: 811–817.
23. Sodhi NS, Posa MRC, Lee TM, Bickford D, Koh LP, et al. (2009) The state and
conservation of Southeast Asian biodiversity. Biodivers Conserv 19: 317–328.
24. Balmford A, Whitten T (2003) Who should pay for tropical conservation, and
how could the costs be met? Oryx 37: 238–250.
25. Laurence WF (2004) The perils of payoff: corruption as a threat to global
biodiversity. Trends Ecol Evol 19: 399–401.
26. Cooke WN (2001) The effects of labour costs and workplace constraints on
foreign direct investment among highly industrialized countries. Int J Hum
Resour Man 12: 697–716.
27. Konings J, Murphy AP (2006) Do multinational enterprises relocate employ-
ment to low-wage regions? Evidence from European multinationals. Rev World
Econ 142: 267–286.
28. Smith RJ, Muir RDJ, Walpole MJ, Balmford A, Leader-Williams N (2003)
Governance and the loss of biodiversity. Nature 426: 67–70.
29. Boyd C, Brooks TM, Butchart SHM, Edgar GJ, da Fonseca GAB, et al. (2008)
Spatial scale and the conservation of threatened species. Conserv Lett 1: 37–43.
30. Bottrill M, Joseph LM, Carwardine J, Bode M, Cook C, et al. (2008) Is
conservation triage just smart decision-making? Trends Ecol Evol 23: 649–654.
31. Carwadine J, Wilson KA, Ceballos G, Ehrlich PR, Naidoo R, et al. (2008) Cost-
effective priorities for global mammal conservation. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
105: 11446–11450.
32. Janicki HP, Wunnava PV (2004) Determinants of foreign direct investment:
empirical evidence from EU accession candidates. J App Econ 36: 505–509.
33. Shaoming C (2006) The role of labour cost in the location choices of Japanese
investors in China. Pap Reg Sci 85: 121–138.
34. Bode M, Wilson KA, Brooks TM, Turner WR, Mittermeier RA, et al. (2008)
Cost-effective global conservation spending is robust to taxonomic group. Proc
Natl Acad Sci U S A 105: 6498–6501.
35. Eggera P, Winner H (2005) Evidence on corruption as an incentive for foreign
direct investment. Eur J Polit Econ 21: 932–952.
36. Me ´on P-G, Sekkat K (2005) Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of
growth? Public Choice 122: 69–97.
37. Rodriguez P, Uhlenbruck K, Eden L (2005) Government corruption and the
entry strategies of multinationals. Acad Manage Rev 30: 383–396.
38. De Sousa L, Larmour P, Hindess B, eds. (2009) Governments, NGOs and Anti
Corruption: the New Integrity Warrior. London and New York: Routledge.
272 p.
39. Khawar M (2005) Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth: A Cross-
Country Analysis. Global Econ J 5: 1–11.
40. Neumayer E, De Soysa I (2005) Trade openness, Foreign Direct Investment and
child labor. World Dev 33: 43–63.
41. The Alliance for Zero Extinction (2008) Database. Available: http://www.
zeroextinction.org. Accessed 2010 July 15.
42. UNDP (2008) 2007/2008 Human Development Report: 01 Human develop-
ment index - GDP index. United Nations Development Programme. New York:
USA. Available: http://unstats.un.org/unsd/mdg. Accessed 2010 July 15.
43. World Bank Group (2000) The World Business Environment Survey. Available:
http://www.gcgf.org/ifcext/economics.nsf/Content/IC-WBESConditions. Ac-
cessed 2010 July 15.
44. The World Bank Group (2010) Worldwide Governance Indicators. The World
Bank Group. Berlin: Germany. Available: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/
wgi/mc_countries.asp. Accessed 2010 July 15.
45. UNDP (2010) International Human Development Indicators. UNDP, New
York: USA Available: http://hdr.undp.org/en/data/trends. Accessed 2010 July
15.
Threatened Species, Corruption and Buying Power
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 July 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 7 | e22749